As I have noted before, it seems that these issues and other “hot button” items exercise the emotions of many within the modern orthodox camp. These issues are important; my concern is that they tend to overshadow the “bread and butter” of Orthodox Judaism.

There are many who are quick to make bold statements on either side of the big issues, but who are silent and absent when it comes to Tefilla B’ Tzibbur (davening with a minyan each day) and regular Torah study.

There are two things about this pretense that concern me.

1. It does not ring true: Our brothers and sisters to our right mock us (rightfully?) when we pronounce on issues while we do not “walk the walk” of Orthodoxy. What good is all the talk if our Modern Orthodox statements are not backed up by Orthodox living?

1. We believe our own hype: Spending our time making declaration on these issues blinds us from the more important fundamental aspects of Orthodox life and leave us believing that as long as we are on the correct side of the argument on the cutting edge issue, even as we fail to excel in the primary and essential aspects of Judaism, we are OK.

We need to redirect our energies so others will take us seriously and so we can take ourselves seriously.

I will explore this classic question of Taamey Hamitzvot (whether there are reasons for mitzvoth) and I then hope to link the answer to Rick’s comment on my post from last week regarding gay Jews.  His question was, once we see people in homosexual relationships with more love and less rejection don’t we run the risk of accepting other forbidden relationships such as incest?

Summary: This is a long post so let me summarize first.  Having a Kiddush to celebrate the commitment of two homosexuals to raising a family together (which is not forbidden)  would not lead us to having a Kiddush for a brother and sister raising a family together as partners because homosexuality is not immoral in our society and incest is.  The torah forbids both but that says nothing about morality, only about halacha.  Both sexual acts are forbidden, neither Kiddush is, but we should not celebrate an incestual union since it is morally depraved and will affect other’s moral compass, whereas a homosexual union, while forbidden, does not effect our moral compass and our ability to imitate God which is only based on mitzvoth which have as their reasons mercy, compassion and morality.

Post: Rick’s is a classic argument against tolerating homosexuality.  From a secular point of view people can make distinctions between one kind of relationship and another (many states permit homosexual weddings but not the other kinds Rick mentioned) but from a religious point of view it is more difficult.  If the Torah is our measure of what is moral and what is forbidden then aren’t all forbidden relationships equally immoral?  If we see in a less harsh light something the Torah forbids then why not permit everything the Torah forbids?   What will stop us from having a Kiddush for an incestual couple if we have one for a homosexual one?  It’s a good question that deserves a serious answer.

The Mishnah (Megilah 25a) states: “One who is leading the prayer service and prays, “Even unto a mother bird does your mercy extend”…we quiet him.””  The Talmud records two opinions as to why this is so (each is an opinion of a different Rabbi named Yosi); either, (1) because we will create jealousy among the creatures (since God is singling out the bird for special treatment), or (2) because this prayer leader is depicting the Torah’s commandments as motivated by mercy and they are nothing more than decrees of the King (with no moral motivation such as mercy behind them).  This Gemara is presenting both sides of the argument -the opinion that mitzvot have no reasons (even those miztvot which seem to reflect moral intentions) and the opinion which holds that the purpose of all Mitzvot are to teach us to be just, merciful and moral.

With regard to this question of the meaning or lack thereof behind the mitzvoth, Maimonides in his book of Jewish law (Mishnah Torah), seems to contradict his opinion in his book of Philosophy (Guide for the Perplexed).  In the Mishna Torah he writes (Laws of Prayer 9:7) that the mitzvoth in general and the mitzvah of sending away the mother bird before takimg her eggs in particular, are decrees and not motivated by mercy, yet in the Guide (III:48)  he writes that this mitzvah and all mitzvoth have rational reasons.  Indeed Maimonides writes that the reasons for all mitzvoth are either to cultivate greater character in us or to correct our ways of thinking.

On this Shabbat, the Shabbat of chukim (laws that do not have reasons) how are we to reconcile this contradiction in Maimonides and indeed this divergence of thought throughout Jewish history?  Do we perform Mitzvot because they are moral and will cultivate greater character and rachamim, mercy, or because they are, plan and simple, just the decree of the King and nothing more?

It is important to note that according to the Talmud we are commanded to imitate certain characteristics and certain acts of the Divine.  The Gemara takes the verse in Deuteronomy which commands us to “walk in God’s ways,” as a commandment to imitate God’s characteristics of mercy and graciousness, “mah hu rachum, af ata rachum.”  This is done, the Talmud says in another place, by imitating four things that God does in the torah: clothing the naked (Adam and Eve), visiting the sick (Abraham), comforting the mourner (Isaac) and burying the dead (Moses).

The Talmud does not pick other things God does for us to imitate and thus be like God.  For instance, making war or wearing tifilin (the midrash).  Why not?   Why don’t all mitzvoth help us to follow God’s midot (characteristics), namely mercy and graciousness?  Why only these 4 mitzvot?

I think the answer to the above contradiction in the Rambam (Maimonides) and to understanding this age old argument as to whether mitzvoth are an expression of morality or not lies in the 6^th chapter of Maimonides’s introduction to Pirkey Avot (the Shmoneh Pirakim, The Eight Chapters).  There the Rambam is bothered by a conflict between the secular (Greek) philosophers and the Talmud.  According to the Talmud if one passes by a restaurant and smells milk and meat cooking together one should not say, “I hate milk and meat cooked together,” but rather should say, “I would like to eat it , yet what can I do my Father in heaven has forbidden it from me.”  This seems opposed to what  Aristotle writes that one should cultivate their moral sensitivities to reach a level where one is repulsed by evil and drawn to the good; it seems the Talmud would be in disagreement with Aristotle feeling one should desire that which is forbidden and then resist it.  (I guess the Rambam was Morethodox since he takes secular philosophy so seriously, but that is for another post).

The Rambam’s answer is a profound one, and I think important for understanding mitzvoth in general and especially those mitzvoth which conflict with our moral sensibilities.  The Rambam says that the Talmud and Aristotle are actually in agreement.   If one finds killing and stealing repugnant, as well as other mitzvoth that come from our moral sense, then both Aristotle and the Talmud would agree that person has cultivated a more refined moral self.  In this realm it is better to say “I do not want to,” than to say “I want but God has forbidden it.”  When it comes to not eating non-kosher food however there is no such moral sensibility to be cultivated.  Eating kosher as well as all other ritual mitzvot have nothing to do with morality.  They are, in the words of the Talmud, only a decree of the king, nothing more, certainly not a violation of a moral principal or for purposes of cultivating character sensibilities.   It is meaningless to say one has reached a level of greater moral refinement, or for that matter according to the Rambam greater spiritual sensitivity, when one is repulsed by meat and milk cooked together.  There is no greater meaning in mitzvoth than being solely the decree of the King unless those mitzvoth are clearly in the realm of morality, rationally understood mitzvoth which have mercy or compassion as their basis.   Hence the Gemara’s statement is not in conflict with Aristotle.

In answer to Rick’s question on my post from last week about welcoming gay Jews, I would argue that many of the Torah’s sexual commandments are in the Rambam’s category of milk and meat, having nothing to do with morality, but rather the “decree of the King.”   Therefore just because the Torah forbids both homosexual sexual acts and incestual sexual acts does not mean that they are morally equivalent   (though the acts may be halachically equivalent). The Torah forbids intercourse with one’s aunt and permits it with one’s uncle.  We must conduct ourselves in accordance with this because it is commanded by our holy torah, but this does not mean that one is moral and one immoral.  We do not need to conclude that one who marries their uncle is a moral person and one who marries their aunt an immoral person.  We can only say that one act is sinful, and the other not.  The same is true of homosexuality.  We can say it is forbidden but I don’t think we can say it is in same moral realm as incest.  When presented with a person who commits crimes that are morally based, such as killing, stealing or oppressing others, we can conclude that they are lacking moral refinement and we should beware of the effect they may have upon others.

We need not worry that welcoming homosexual Jews into our community means we have no moral compass and tomorrow we will welcome adults who commit sexual acts with children (which is not actually one of the sexual sins in the torah) or brothers and sisters who want to marry.  Those are morally repugnant to us if we are morally refined people.  The torah wants us to have a moral compass, this is the function of being merciful and gracious, the two midot we are supposed to imitate about god.   Is it moral to welcome people into shul who are gay?  That is a moral question, outside the purview of halacha.   Should we welcome people who are mean?   Who steal?  Who cheat on their taxes?  Who would like to murder?  No.  Those are people with less refined moral sensitivities and we should be wary of it rubbing off on us.   People who don’t keep kosher?   People who eat milk and meat together?  They are not immoral; sinful yes, but not immoral.

So Rick fear not, there is no danger that in welcoming gays into our shuls, which is not halachically forbidden, (and I think is an act of rachum and chanun and therefore indeed a moral act) that we should fear a Kiddush on behalf of an incestual couple (which would not be moral).  Is gay male sex an issur diorite (forbidden by the torah?), yes.  Is it immoral in our society?  Not today.   Is sex between a 30 year old man and a 10 year old girl asur (forbidden)?  No.  Is it immoral?  Of course.   I’m not saying who we should give aliot to, I am just saying that homosexuality (and marying your aunt for that matter)  is not morally equivalent to other forbidden relationships.

Last week I wrote of welcoming intermarried families and this week I would like to address how we see another population of Jews that often feels unwelcomed -Jewish people who are not physically attracted to people of the opposite gender, but only to the same gender, and how we as communities observant of halacha can welcome them and to what extent.

Various studies estimate that anywhere from 4%-20% of the American population is homosexual.  It would be dangerous for us to believe that Orthodox Jews are an exception.  That the torah forbids men from having sexual relations with each other is testament that in the Torah’s preview such a desire does exist.

My community encompasses several gay members, some are open about it and some are not, some have partners or are married and others are not, some live a celibate life alone (or have tried to) and others do not.   Just as there isn’t one type of heterosexual person so too there is not homogeneity among homosexuals.  Ultimately people are individuals (an entire universe of their own, as the Mishna in Sanhedrin says), and must be attended to as such.

What should an orthodox Rabbi do when a congregant comes out to him?  What should an Orthodox community’s attitude be toward their gay brethren?   Should we reject them?  Accept them?  Tell them they can never live a life with a family and have children?  Find them a proper partner?

I would argue that while Orthodox rabbis and communities can’t celebrate same gender weddings, at the same time we do not have to concern ourselves with what happens in everyone’s bedrooms.  For instance, some upstanding Orthodox rabbis perform weddings for people they know are not going to go to the mikvah regularly (though we hope they will one day).  Halachikally in fact, it may be worse for a man to have intercourse with a woman who has not gone to the mikvah after menstruating, than it is for a lesbian couple to be intimate and possibly even for a gay male couple to be intimate (in some ways).

Perhaps we should take at face value that people are living together and raising Jewish families together. Though I am not suggesting celebrating or performing same gender weddings, perhaps we can celebrate the fact that two people commit to living with each other forever, raising Jewish observant children together, keeping Shabbos as a family, keeping kosher, singing nigunim and learning Torah.

I am not suggesting we change the Torah or Jewish law, rather I am pointing out ways we can view things in order to better welcome the entire Jewish people into communities that study and observe the Torah.

We may fear that by being welcoming to gay Jews and families with same gender parents we are implicitly offering legitimacy to things the torah forbids.  But aren’t we just as scared of condemning people to a lonely life that they cannot lead?  I am not saying no one can be celibate; certainly there are people who can do it.  There are people who will commit their lives to serving the community, to a relationship only with God and with friends with no intimacy and no eizer kinegdo (helpmate).  But this is not everyone and I’m not sure it’s the best path for most.  How many joyous mitzvot that are most fully observed as a family must we sacrifice for this one issur (forbidden thing), which may be in many instances a rabbinic one?

I’m not saying we should be cavalier. I am not saying all of a sudden we should have  engagement parties for gay couples, but what if we had a cake at kiddush one Shabbat (albeit a big cake or one with small writing) that said “Mazal Tov on your commitment to each other forever to raise a Jewish family!”?

I remember I was once at a meeting of rabbis where one Rabbi argued that we should protest the Jewish newspapers for including ads announcing gay marriages.  He said if we did not our children would think it was ok to become gay.  I have no doubt this Rabbi had never know a gay Orthodox Jew well.  If he had he would know that often gay Orthodox Jews want nothing more than to be straight, it is not a choice most make.

I will finish with the wise words an observant gay Jew once said to me:  We must be clear that there is a difference between halacha (Jewish law) and homophobia.  When our personal fears and prejudices hide under the banner of halacha, when we use the Torah as a spade to dig with in service of our own predilections, egos and anxieties, we not only do a disservice to the Jewish people but to the Torah itself.